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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of excess cash on the liquidity risk faced by investors and their 
required liquidity premium. It shows that excess cash improves trading continuity and reduces 
both liquidity risk and the cost of equity capital. These findings are consistent with the view that 
firms with excess cash attract more traders even when market liquidity dries up. The increase in 
investors’ trading propensity reduces stock price exposure to shocks to market liquidity and the 
liquidity premium required by investors. We also examine the impact of excess cash on firm value. 
We show that while the direct effect of excess cash on firm value is negative, its indirect effect 
through liquidity is significantly positive, indicating that investors are less likely to sanction (or 
even reward) illiquid firms for holding excess cash. Further analysis suggests that the liquidity 
benefits of excess cash are greater for financially constrained firms and firms with high growth 
opportunities. Our results are robust over time, after addressing endogeneity concerns, and to 
alternative estimation methods and alternative measures of liquidity.  
Keywords: Excess cash holdings; Asset liquidity; Stock liquidity; Liquidity risk; Cost of equity 
capital 
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1. Introduction 
Cash reserves held by US firms have increased considerably in the last few decades. According 
to Huang et al. (2013), non-financial firms increased their holdings of cash and other liquid assets 
to a record $2 trillion in 2011. Early studies, such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986), 
and Myers and Majluf (1984), have debated the potential costs and benefits of corporate cash 
holdings. Related studies by Opler et al. (1999) and Harford et al. (2008) have investigated the 
effect of various financial variables on the level of corporate cash reserves and identified size, 
book-to-market ratio, and past cash flows as the key determinants of corporate cash holdings. 
More recently, a number of papers have focused on whether investors sanction firms for hoarding 
cash in excess of the level predicted by firm characteristics (“excess cash”). However, the results 
of these studies have been relatively mixed. For example, Simutin (2010) documents a positive 
association between excess cash and stock returns, implying that investors view excess cash as a 
proxy for risky growth opportunities. Nevertheless, Asem and Alam (2014) show that the 
relationship between excess cash and stock returns depends on investors’ outlook for firm 
prospects and conclude that investors’ support for cash hoards is not ubiquitous.   
  In this study, we assess investors’ perceptions of excess cash from a different perspective. 
Specifically, we investigate whether excess cash affects stock trading continuity and the liquidity 
risk faced by investors. Excess cash may affect stock trading continuity and liquidity risk in two 
ways. On the one hand, it is commonly argued that managers hoard cash to cushion shortfalls in 
future cash flows (e.g., Bates et al., 2009; Palazzo, 2012) or to finance growth (Simutin, 2010). 
Consistent with this prediction, Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibilkov (2009) show 
that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms with valuable growth 
opportunities. Similarly, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) and Brown and Petersen (2011) find 
that the value of cash holdings is highest in R&D intensive firms, as cash reserves help these firms 
avoid the high adjustment costs associated with altering the path of R&D projects. Since cash 
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helps firms finance their profitable investment opportunities and survive economic downturns, 
excess cash may serve as a useful mechanism for firms, particularly financially constrained ones 
and/or those with valuable growth opportunities, to attract investors. If firms with excess cash 
attract more traders when market liquidity dries up, their stock prices should exhibit less exposure 
to shocks to market liquidity. The decrease in liquidity risk would, in turn, reduce the liquidity 
premium and the cost of equity capital. In what follows, we will refer to this hypothesis as the 
investment opportunities hypothesis.  
On the other hand, the theory of free cash flow suggests that managers may hold excess 
cash to pursue their own objectives at shareholders’ expense (Jensen, 1986). These agency 
conflicts are aggravated in the presence of greater information asymmetry, as the lack of 
transparency makes it difficult to monitor or discipline misbehaving managers (Ball et al., 2000, 
2003; Ball, 2006). Johnson et al. (2000) argue that minority shareholders are exposed to greater 
expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders during economic downturns. Because of 
the heightened fear of expropriation, stocks of firms with excess cash reserves may be unattractive 
to investors and may therefore be less liquid. The decline in stock liquidity would make the stock 
price more vulnerable to shocks to market liquidity. As investors face higher liquidity risk, they 
would require a higher liquidity premium, which in turn would increase the cost of equity capital. 
We will refer to this hypothesis in what follows as the management entrenchment hypothesis. 
We test the above hypotheses using a large sample of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common 
stocks over the period 1991 – 2014. Our definition of liquidity risk is based on the premise that 
non-trading reflects illiquidity (Liu, 2006; Lin et al., 2009). Because investors are expected to 
trade only when the benefits of trading exceed trading costs (Lesmond et al., 1999), greater 
incidence of no trading indicates higher (unobservable) trading costs and lower liquidity (Lin et 
al., 2009). While the bid-ask spread has also been commonly used as a trading cost measure, the 
bid and ask quotes are often relevant to small trades, as large transactions are usually negotiated 
(Lin et al., 2009). Furthermore, Liu (2006) argues that liquidity has multiple dimensions and is 
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not well represented by bid-ask spread or any other traditional measure, such as illiquidity measure 
of Amihud (2002) and the turnover measure of Datar et al. (1998). Liu also shows that his trading 
discontinuity measure (LM12), which is defined as standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero 
daily trading volumes over the prior 12 months, is able to capture multiple dimensions of liquidity, 
including trading speed, trading quantity, and trading cost. 
Our analysis provides strong evidence in support of the investment opportunities 
hypothesis and refutes the management entrenchment argument. Specifically, we find a 
significantly negative association between excess cash holdings and Liu’s (2006) LM12, 
consistent with the view that excess cash attracts more traders and reduces incidents of no trading. 
We also find strong evidence that firms with high levels of excess cash exhibit lower liquidity 
risk. All else being equal, a one unit increase in excess cash is associated with an average reduction 
of 0.489 percentage points (or 5.366% relative to the sample mean) per annum in the cost of 
capital, indicating that the economic benefit of excess cash is nontrivial. We also evaluate the 
impact of excess cash on firm value. In addition to the direct effect, we show that excess cash 
affects firm value indirectly through its interaction with the firm’s stock liquidity. Specifically, 
we find that while the direct effect of excess cash on firm value is negative, the value of the 
marginal dollar of excess cash held by illiquid firms is significantly higher than that held by more 
liquid firms. Further analysis suggests that the liquidity benefits of excess cash are greater for 
financially constrained firms and firms with high growth opportunities. Our results are robust over 
time, after addressing endogeneity concerns, and to alternative measures of the key variables and 
alternative estimation methods.  
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to investigate the relationship between excess cash and liquidity risk. 
Existing studies (e.g., Gopalan et al., 2012; Charoenwong et al., 2014) focus on the impact of asset 
liquidity, measured as the level of cash in the firm’s balance sheet, on one or a few dimensions of 
stock liquidity, such as trading volume, bid-ask spread, and Amihud’s illiquidity ratio. In this 
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study, we emphasize excess cash for two reasons: (i) excess cash has the potential to capture 
information about firm prospects above and beyond that reflected in the usual proxies such as size 
and book-to-market ratio (Simutin, 2010); and (ii) it is more likely to be wasted by entrenched 
managers (Harford et al., 2008). Further, Liu (2006) argues that, due to the multifaceted nature of 
liquidity, conventional liquidity measures, such as trading volume and bid-ask spread, may not 
fully reflect liquidity. Thus, unlike prior studies, we use Liu’s LM12 to capture multiple 
dimensions of liquidity. We also use liquidity betas estimated from Liu’s liquidity-augmented 
CAPM (LCAPM) to examine the link between excess cash holdings and the sensitivity of stock 
returns to shocks to market liquidity.  
Second, our study contributes to the literature on how cash holding can benefit firms facing 
financing frictions. Several studies argue and show that excess cash can benefit firms by 
minimizing the need to fund future investment opportunities with costly external financing (Kim 
et al., 1998; Almeida et al., 2004; Acharya et al., 2007). Our study identifies a new channel through 
which excess cash can reduce the cost of financing. Specifically, we argue, and find confirming 
empirical evidence, that excess cash increases trading activity and reduces the liquidity premium 
required by investors. This evidence is particularly strong among financially constrained firms 
and firms with valuable growth opportunities. The liquidity benefits of excess is also evident from 
our analysis of the joint effect of excess cash and stock liquidity on firm value. Unlike existing 
studies, which focus on the direct impact of excess cash on firm value (Faulkender and Wang, 
2006; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Pinkowitz and Williamson; 2006), we show that excess cash also 
affects firm value indirectly through its impact on stock liquidity.       
Third, this study improves our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie the relation 
between excess cash holdings and expected stock returns. Simutin (2010) documents a positive 
association between excess cash and future returns. He also shows that high excess cash firms 
have higher market betas and investment expenditures. His findings indicate that high excess cash 
firms earn higher returns because they are riskier than their low excess cash counterparts. Asem 
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and Alam (2014) examine the link between excess cash and stock returns in advancing and 
declining markets. They document an inverted U-shaped relationship when investors expect 
declines in future cash flows and a generally positive relationship when they expect increases in 
growth opportunities. We contribute to this strand of research by providing a rationale and 
evidence on how liquidity risk acts as a channel through which excess cash holdings can affect 
expected stock returns.  
Finally, our study complements the literature exploring the determinants of liquidity risk. 
For example, Ng (2011) reports a negative association between information quality and liquidity 
risk. Cao and Petrasek (2014) find that institutional ownership lowers liquidity betas, consistent 
with Baker and Stein’s (2004) argument that institutional ownership reduces stock returns 
exposure to fluctuations in market liquidity because institutional trades are less likely to be 
motivated by sentiment than individual trades. We extend this line of research by showing that 
excess cash holdings is another important determinant of systematic liquidity risk. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 explains how we measure our key variables and specifies 
the empirical models used for hypothesis testing. Section 4 describes our data and summary 
statistics. Section 5 discusses our main empirical findings. Section 6 reports the results of our 
robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.       
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development  
In a perfect capital market environment, holdings of cash and liquid assets are irrelevant. This is 
because firms can raise external capital to operate and grow at zero cost. Furthermore, since there 
is no liquidity premium in such an environment, cash holdings have no opportunity cost and, 
therefore, do not affect shareholder wealth (Opler et al., 1999). However, in a world with 
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imperfections, such as information asymmetry, agency conflicts, and financial distress, cash 
reverses can have a significant impact on firm performance and market value.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that information asymmetries between shareholders and 
managers can cause severe underpricing of firm securities and can make it expensive for firms to 
raise external funds. When information asymmetries are high, a cash flow shortfall may involve 
greater costs, as it can prevent firms from financing their operations and investing in profitable 
projects. These costs are expected to be larger for firms with high research and development 
(R&D) expenses (Opler and Titman, 1994) and greater investment opportunities (Smith and 
Watts, 1992; Jung et al., 1996; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007). Thus, when information 
asymmetries are important, firms can find it profitable to hoard high levels of excess cash in order 
to mitigate costs of financial distress. However, in the presence of agency conflicts, managers may 
hold excess cash to pursue their own objectives rather than maximize shareholders’ wealth (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Excess cash provides managers with more flexibility in making investment 
decisions and enables them to avoid market discipline. It also allows entrenched managers to 
increase private benefits of control or engage in empire building by undertaking projects that 
outside investors are not willing to finance (Jung et al., 1996). Hence, excess cash can destroy 
firm value and should optimally be kept low to mitigate the conflicts of interests between 
managers and shareholders (Stulz, 1990). 
 Most of the existing empirical studies evaluate the relative costs and benefits of cash 
holdings by examining the effects of cash reserves on firm performance and market value. 
Unfortunately, the results have been inconclusive. Some studies show that high levels of cash 
destroy shareholder value. For example, Harford (1999) finds that firms with large cash reverses 
are more likely to engage in value destroying acquisitions and capital investments. Similarly, Lee 
and Powell (2011) show that firms that persistently hold excess cash underperform in the long-
run. Other studies, such as Mikkelson and Partch (2003), find that firms with high cash holdings 
have a higher median operating performance than their low cash holding counterparts. Yet another 
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group of studies documents that the value of excess cash varies with firm characteristics. For 
example, Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibilkow (2009) show that the marginal 
value of cash is higher for financially constrained firms with valuable investment opportunities, 
while Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) find that the marginal value of cash is higher in R&D 
intensive industries. 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the link between asset liquidity and 
stock liquidity. Gopalan et al. (2012) develop a model in which the relationship between asset 
liquidity and stock liquidity depends on the tendency of the firm to invest. Specifically, liquid 
assets, if not reinvested, would reduce the valuation uncertainty associated with assets-in-place 
and improve stock liquidity. However, reinvesting liquid assets would lead to greater uncertainty 
about future assets and lower stock liquidity. Consistent with their model, Gopalan et al. (2012) 
document a positive association between asset liquidity and stock liquidity and show that this 
relationship is stronger for firms that are less likely to reinvest their liquid assets. Charoenwong 
et al. (2014) also examine the relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity across 47 
countries. They find that, on average, firms with greater asset liquidity have higher stock liquidity. 
Consistent with the valuation uncertainty argument, they also show that the asset-stock liquidity 
relation is more positive in countries with poor accounting transparency.  
The focus of prior studies has been on the impact of the level of cash holding on the 
conventional measures of stock liquidity, such as bid-ask spread, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity, and 
Datar et al.’s (1998) turnover measure. In this paper, we investigate the impact of cash in excess 
of that of the level required to fund normal operations and investments on both trading continuity 
and liquidity risk. Excess cash is different from the level of cash as it is shown to contain important 
information about firm prospects (Simutin, 2010) and is more likely to be wasted by entrenched 
managers (Harford et al., 2008). Our liquidity proxies are also different from the conventional 
measures of liquidity, which tend to focus on one dimension of liquidity and, since liquidity is 
multifaceted, none of them can capture liquidity risk fully. In this study, we use Liu’s (2006) 
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trading continuity measure (LM12), which is shown to simultaneously capture the trading speed, 
the trading quantity, and the trading cost dimensions of liquidity, as our main proxy for liquidity.     
We argue that the impact of cash holdings on trading continuity will depend on the ability 
of firms with excess cash to attract uninformed investors to participate in stock trading. The 
investment opportunities hypothesis suggests that excess cash can reduce the cost of capital 
through two channels: (i) through the efficient utilization of a cheap from of funding (relative to 
equity), which would help firms avoid disruptions to their existing operations and provide greater 
certainty on the funding and implementation of their future investment plans (Opler et al., 1999; 
Bates et al., 2009); and (i) through the reduction of the liquidity premium due to increased trading 
participation. Our study emphasizes the latter. Specifically, we argue that if cash holdings lower 
the volatility in the value of assets-in-place (Gopalan et al., 2012), firms with excess cash would 
attract more investors, particularly uninformed investors. The increased participation of 
uninformed traders would reduce the market makers’ inventory costs and adverse selection costs, 
allowing the latter to provide services at a lower cost. The reduction in trading costs would, in 
turn, increase investors’ propensity to trade and improve trading continuity (Lin et al., 2009). As 
high excess cash improves trading continuity, stock prices of firms with excess cash should 
become more resilient and less sensitive to innovations in aggregate market liquidity. The reduced 
liquidity risk would lower the liquidity premium and the cost of equity capital.  
In contrast, the management entrenchment hypothesis predicts a negative association between 
excess cash and trading continuity. Empirical studies on the determinants of cash holdings 
document a significantly positive association between cash holdings and information asymmetry 
(e.g., Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Garcia-Teruel et 
al., 2009). Specifically, these studies show that firms with high levels of financially opacity tend 
to face excessive costs of external finance and are therefore expected to hoard more cash. The 
high level of information asymmetry can aggravate the agency costs of cash (Jensen, 1986) and 
make firms with excess cash reverses less attractive to uninformed traders. The reduced 
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participation of uninformed traders would increase market makers’ losses from trading with 
informed traders and the costs they charge for providing liquidity services. The increased trading 
costs would reduce investors’ propensity to trade and increase the chance of firms with excess 
cash facing trading discontinuity. As the liquidity environment deteriorates, stock prices should 
become less resilient and more exposed to shocks to market liquidity. Consequently, investors 
face greater liquidity risk and require a higher liquidity premium which, in turn, increases the cost 
of equity capital. 
The above arguments suggest that the impact of excess cash on trading continuity, liquidity 
risk, and the cost of equity is theoretically ambiguous. As a result of this ambiguity, we choose to 
address the issue empirically. Throughout our analysis, we focus on the following four questions. 
First, does excess cash improve or worsen trading continuity? Second, does excess cash increase 
or decrease liquidity risk? Third, does excess cash increase or reduce the cost of equity capital? 
Fourth, does excess cash affect firm value? Finally, does the effect of excess cash on trading 
continuity and liquidity risk depend on the firm’s growth opportunities and its access to external 
financing? 
 
3. Measurement of variables and model specification 
3.1. Measurement of trading continuity and liquidity risk 
Following Liu (2006), we measure stock liquidity as the standardized turnover-adjusted number 
of days with zero trading volume over the prior 12 months (LM12): ܮܯͳʹ = [ܼܧܴܱܵ + ͳ/ܷܴܱܸܶܰܧܴܦܧܨܮܣܱܴܶ ] ∗ ʹ5ʹܴܶܣܦ     (1) 
where ZEROS is the total number of zero daily trading volume over the prior 12 months, 
TURNOVER is the sum of daily turnover over the prior 12 months, DEFLATOR is set to 11,000 
as in Liu (2006) in order to ensure that Ͳ < ଵ/்௎�ேை௏ா�஽ாி��்ை� < ͳ for all stocks, and TRAD is the total 
number of trading days over the prior 12 months.  
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 This measure is based on the intuition that incidents of no trading reflect higher latent costs 
of trading, with higher values of LM12 indicating low levels of trading continuity and high degrees 
of illiquidity (Lin et al., 2009). It also captures the multifaceted aspects of liquidity, placing 
particular emphasis on trading speed, which has been largely ignored in the previous studies (Liu, 
2006). 
 After calculating LM12, we use Liu’s (2006) two-factor model and estimate liquidity risk 
by running the following time-series regression for each firm and every year over our sample 
period: 1 ��� − ��� = ߙ� + ߚ�௠(�௠� − ���) + ߚ�௟ܮܫܳ�,� + ���     (2) 
where ���, ���, and  �௠� are monthly returns on firm i, the US market, and the one-month Treasury 
bill2;  ܮܫܳ�,� is the liquidity mimicking factor, defined as the return difference between a low-
liquidity portfolio (containing high LM12 stocks) and a high liquidity portfolio (containing low 
LM12)3;  and the factor loadings ߚ�௠ and ߚ�௟ represent the stock i’s market beta and liquidity risk, 
respectively. 
 
3.2. Measurement of excess cash  
Following others (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Harford et al., 2008; Asem and Alam, 2014), each year, 
we estimate excess cash for firm i as the residual of the following cross-sectional regression: 
                                            
1
 Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure liquidity risk as the sensitivity of stock returns to innovations in 
market-wide liquidity. However, their measure is designed to capture the illiquidity that relates to the price 
of impacts of trades rather than the liquidity risk stemming from trading discontinuity (Lin et al., 2009) 
and works better for portfolios than individual stocks (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003).   
2
 Data on ���, and  �௠� is obtained from Kenneth French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html 
3
 We are very grateful to Weimin Liu for providing us with his liquidity factors. For more details on the 
construction of these factors refer to Liu (2006, pp. 550-551). 
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ܥܣܵܪ� = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܥܨ� + ߙଶܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ� + ߙଷܯܶܤ� + ߙସܵܫܼܧ� + ߙହܹܰܥ�+ ߙ଺ܥܣܲܧܺ� + ߙ଻ܦܫ �ܸ + ߙ଼ܴ&ܦ� + ߙଽܴܧܩ� + ߙଵ଴ܫܰܦܵܫܩ� + ��       (3) 
where CASH is the natural log of cash and short-term investments scaled by net assets;  CF is 
earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes, but before depreciation scaled by net assets;  
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to net assets;  MTB is the market value of assets divided by 
total assets; SIZE is the natural log of net assets deflated in 1994 dollars; NWC is net working 
capital (net of cash), scaled by net assets; CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by net assets;  DIV 
is a dummy variable with a value of one if the firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise; R&D is 
the research and development expenditures scaled by sales; REG is a dummy which equals one if 
the firm is in a regulated industry, and zero otherwise;4 INDSIG is industry cash flow risk, defined 
as the mean of the ratio of the standard deviations of cash flows to the total assets over 20 years 
for firms in the same industry (by 2-digit SIC code).  
All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles to mitigate outlier effects. The 
exponential form of residual �� is used as a proxy for firm i’s excess cash (ECASH) in a given 
year. A positive (negative) residual indicates that the firm hoards more (less) cash than it needs 
for its normal operational activities and investments during that year. 
 
3.3. Model specification 
To test the effects of excess cash on trading continuity and liquidity risk, we estimate the following 
regression:5  ܮܫܷܳܫܦܫܶ �ܻ,� = ߙ + ߚ஼ܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ + ߛܼ�,�−ଵ + ܻܧܣܴ + ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ + ߮�,�     (4) 
where subscripts i and t represent firm and year, respectively; ܮܫܷܳܫܦܫܻܶ  represents firm 
liquidity and is measured in the following two different ways: (a) as the natural logarithm of Liu’s 
                                            
4
 As per Barclay and Smith (1995), regulated industries are railroads (SIC code 4011), trucking (SIC code 
4210 and 4213), airlines (SIC code 4512), and telecom (SIC code 4812 and 4813). 
5
 We also use cash instead of excess cash as our main independent variable and our conclusion remains 
unchanged. Further details on these results are available upon request.   
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(2006) LM12 (��ܮܯͳʹሻ and (b) as the liquidity beta (ߚ�௟) in Equation (2) (ܮܫܳܤܧܶܣ); ܧܥܣܵܪ is 
the cash in excess of normal operations and investments, estimated as the exponential form of the 
residual term in Equation (3); ܼi,t-1 is a vector of control variables, which are lagged one year to 
mitigate reverse causality concerns; ܻܧܣܴ  and ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ  are year and industry dummies, 
respectively; and ߮ is a residual error term.  
Building on the related literature (e.g., Brockman et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2009; Ng, 2011), 
we include in our regressions several control variables that are known to affect stock liquidity. 
These variables are market-to-book ratio (MTB), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), a 
dummy for dividend payers (DIV), capital expenditures (CAPEX), R&D expenses (R&D), stock 
price (PRICE), stock return (RET), the number of shareholders (NSHAR), block ownership 
(BLOCK), institutional ownership (IO), and a dummy for NASDAQ stocks (NASDAQ). Following 
Lin et al. (2009), we also add ��ܮܯͳʹ to the list of control variables when ܮܫܳܤܧܶܣ is used as 
the dependent variable in Equation (4). Appendix A provides a detailed definition of all variables 
used in our regressions. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. We further include 
year and industry dummies to control for potential year and industry fixed effects. Finally, we use 
robust standard errors that are adjusted for double clustering by firm and year.   
 
4. Data and summary statistics 
Our initial sample consists of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks of US industrial firms, 
excluding utilities (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), with available 
accounting data from Compustat at any time during the period of 1991 – 2014. Stock price data is 
collected from CRSP. Ownership data is obtained from Worldscope and Thomson Reuters 
Institutional (13F) Holdings. To ensure the firms are publicly traded, we only include firms that 
have securities with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. We also exclude stocks with share prices of 
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less than $5 or greater than $1000 and those traded for less than 200 days in the previous year.6 
To mitigate any potential bias from the small size effect, we also exclude firms with market 
capitalizations of less than 10 million dollars. Finally, to reduce the effect of outliers, we exclude 
firms with negative assets, negative sales, and those with annual assets or sales growth larger than 
100%. The final sample includes 3,810 firms and 28,310 firm-years.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 reports the firm characteristics for the full sample and the subsamples by exchange 
listing. It shows that NASDAQ firms are smaller, have a smaller shareholder base, and are traded 
less frequently than the NYSE/AMEX firms. It also shows that firms traded on NASDAQ have 
greater growth opportunities, hold more cash, and pay less dividends than those traded in 
NYSE/AMEX. These findings provide initial evidence consistent with the view that managers 
hoard cash to cushion shortfalls in future cash flows and/or to finance growth (Bates et al., 2009; 
Simutin, 2010; Palazzo, 2012).  
Table 2 presents the unconditional correlations across firm-years between the various 
variables included in our analysis. The highest correlation is between INVESTOR and SIZE (0.56), 
which indicates that large firms attract more investors and therefore have a larger investor base. 
The correlation between PRICE and SIZE is also relatively high (0.53). The correlation between 
DIVIDEND and NASDAQ is -0.34, implying that firms listed on NASDAQ stock exchange are 
less likely to pay dividends. The correlation between lnLM12 and LIQBETA is positive and 
significant, implying that trading discontinuity increases liquidity risk. This result is consistent 
with Acharya and Pedersen (2005), who report a negative association between liquidity risk and 
liquidity level. The correlation between ECASH and lnLM12 is significantly negative (-0.06), 
                                            
6
 Amihud (2002) argues that excluding stocks that are traded less than 200 days in the previous year helps 
to mitigate the potential effect of thin trading problems on the results.  
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while that between ECASH and LIQBETA is positive and significant (0.07), providing preliminary 
evidence in support of our investment opportunities hypothesis, which suggests that excess cash 
increases trading continuity and reduces liquidity risk.  
We use variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis to diagnose multicollinearity. The mean 
VIF of the variables is 1.57, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious problem in our study.   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5. Empirical Findings 
5.1. Core findings 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating Equation (4). The first four columns present the results 
with lnLM12 as the dependent variable. Column (1) reports the results with excess cash as the 
only explanatory variable. It shows that the coefficient on ECASH is negative and highly 
significant, with a 1% increase in excess cash resulting in a 3.9% decrease in lnLM12. Column (2) 
shows that the significantly negative effect of excess cash on trading discontinuity remains after 
controlling for other determinants of stock liquidity. Columns (3) and (4) present the results for 
the two subsamples by exchange listing. While the coefficient on ECASH is significantly negative 
in both subsamples, its magnitude is more than double for the NASDAQ than the NYSE/AMEX 
firms. Specifically, we find that a 1% increase in excess cash increases liquidity (i.e. decreases 
lnLM12) by 1.9% for NYSE/AMEX firms and 5.8% for NASDAQ firms. These findings are 
consistent with the investment opportunities hypothesis, which predicts the liquidity benefits of 
excess cash to be stronger for smaller firms with greater growth opportunities (Opler et al., 1999; 
Bates et al., 2009).    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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Columns (5) to (8) report the results of Equation (4) with ܮܫܳܤܧܶܣ as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient on ECASH in column (5) is negative and significant, implying that excess 
cash reduces liquidity risk. In economic terms, a 1% increase in excess cash lowers liquidity risk 
by 5.6%. This finding is robust after controlling for other determinants of liquidity risk (column 
(6)). Columns (7) and (8) show that the coefficients on ECASH for the subsamples of 
NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ firms are -0.041 (t-value = -4.188) and -0.074 (t-value = -4.519), 
respectively, implying that the liquidity benefits from holding excess cash are stronger for 
NASDAQ firms. This evidence is again consistent with the investment opportunities hypothesis, 
which posits that small firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to benefit from 
holding excess cash.  
To derive a better understanding of the economic significance of our results, we quantify 
the effects of excess cash on the cost of capital through liquidity risk. Following Lin et al. (2009) 
and Ng (2011), we estimate the liquidity risk premium per unit of liquidity risk (ܧሺܮܫܳሻ) as the 
long-term average of the liquidity mimicking factor (LIQ). Since we are using monthly data to 
estimate LIQBETA, we estimate the annualized reduction in the cost of equity capital associated 
with a 1% increase in excess cash by compounding ܮܫܳܤܧܶܣ ∗ ܧሺܮܫܳሻ for 12 months. The value 
of ܧሺܮܫܳሻ during the period 1991 – 2014 is 0.69% per month, which is similar to Liu (2006) and 
Lin et al. (2009).7  Column (6) suggests that a one unit increase in excess cash is associated with 
an average reduction of 0.065 in liquidity risk, which translates into an average reduction of 0.54 
(i.e., (1+(0.065*0.69%))12 – 1) percentage points per annum in the liquidity premium required by 
investors. This is a nontrivial reduction, as it represents 5.816% of average cost of equity for the 
sample firms.8 Columns (7) and (8) show that a one unit increase in excess cash is associated with 
                                            
7
 The estimated monthly mean values of LIQ documented in Liu (2006) and Lin et al. (2009) are 0.749% 
(1964-2003) and 0.76% (1975-2004), respectively. 
8
 We estimate the average cost of equity capital (ܧሺ��ሻ) using the following LCAPM model: ܧሺ��ሻ − �� = ߚ�௠(ܧሺ�௠ሻ − ��) + ߚ�௟ܧሺܮܫܳሻ, where ܧሺ�௠ሻ, ܧሺܮܫܳሻ and ��  are the long-term averages of the market 
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an average reduction of 0.043 and 0.082 in the liquidity risk for the subsamples of NYSE/AMEX 
and NASDAQ firms, respectively. This indicates that, all else equal, a one unit increase in excess 
cash lowers the cost of capital for NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ firms by 0.357 and 0.681 
percentage points per annum, respectively.  
Among the control variables in Table 3, firm size and book-to-market ratio are negatively 
associated with trading discontinuity and liquidity risk, a result consistent with Cao and Petrasek 
(2014). Stock price is positively related to trading discontinuity and liquidity beta, consistent with 
the view that low-priced stocks attract more informed traders (see, e.g., Schultz, 2000; Easley et 
al., 2001). Prior return is negatively related to trading discontinuity and liquidity risk, indicating 
that firms whose stocks have recently performed well attract more traders and hence exhibit a 
lower exposure to innovations in aggregate liquidity. Trading discontinuity and liquidity betas are 
also smaller for firms with higher capital expenditures and higher R&D expenditures. 
Furthermore, the effects of leverage, dividends, and investor base on trading discontinuity and 
liquidity beta are positive and significant at the 1% level. Moreover, we show that block 
shareholding is significantly negatively related to trading continuity, suggesting that block 
ownership is detrimental to the firm’s trading activities (Brockman et al., 2009). Institutional 
ownership also has a significantly positive effect on both trading continuity and liquidity risk, 
consistent with Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennett et al. (2003).  In the regressions with 
LIQBETA as the dependent variable, the coefficient on lnLM12 is positive and significant, 
implying that trading discontinuity increases stock price vulnerability to shocks to market liquidity 
(see, e.g., Liu, 2006; Lin et al., 2009). Nevertheless, none of these variables subsume the effect of 
excess cash on trading continuity and liquidity beta. Specifically, we show that excess cash alone 
accounts for 7.9% of the cross-sectional variation in lnLM12, whereas the adjusted R2 is 26% after 
                                            
return, liquidity mimicking factor and risk free rate, respectively. During the sample period, we have �� = 
0.22%, (ܧሺ�௠ሻ − ��) = 0.65%, and ܧሺܮܫܳሻ = 0.69%. We estimate the cost of equity capital per annum by 
compounding ܧሺ��ሻ over 12 months. The average cost of capital for our sample firms is about 9.28%.     
18 
 
including the control variables. We also show that excess cash accounts for 3.1% of the variation 
in liquidity betas and the adjusted R2 increases to 4.4% after controlling for other determinants of 
liquidity risk.  
To gain further insight into the liquidity benefit of excess cash, we fit the following 
regression:9 ܳ�,� = �଴ + �ଵܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ + �ଶܮܫܷܳܫܦܫܶ �ܻ,� + �ଷܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ ∗ ܮܫܷܳܫܦܫܶ �ܻ,� +  ߛܺ�,�−ଵ +ܻܧܣܴ + ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ + ߭�,�                                                                         (5) 
where ܳ�,� is a proxy for firm value and is defined as the ratio of market value of assets (book 
value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity) to book value of assets 
(see, e.g., Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Servaes (1991), and Nohel and Tarhan (1998).10 The ܺ�,�−ଵ 
is a vector of lagged control variables, which includes firm size (SIZE), daily turnover by volume 
(TURNOVER), long-term debt divided by total assets (LTD), a dummy for dividend payers (DIV), 
capital expenditures (CAPEX), return on assets (ROA). The choice of these variables is guided by 
the literature on determinants of firm value (see, e.g., Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Carter et al., 
2006; Roll et al., 2009) and their detailed definitions are provided in the Appendix. The rest of 
variables in Equation (5) are as defined in Section 3.3.  
 Table 4 reports the results for different specifications of Equation (5). The coefficient on ܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ is negative and significant, indicating that shareholders value the marginal dollar of 
excess cash significantly lower than its face value. Similar results are reported by Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2007) and Dittmr and Mahrt-Smith (2007), who examined the impact of the level of 
cash holdings on firm value.11 The coefficient on lnLM12 is negative and significant, suggesting 
                                            
9
 We are grateful to anonymous referee for making this suggestion.   
10
 For robustness purposes, we also define Q as the ratio of market value of firm (market value of equity 
plus book value of debt) to book value of firm (total assets)  (see, e.g., Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Pinkowitz 
et al., 2006). The results of these analysis are available upon request. 
11
 Existing evidence shows that the impact of cash holdings on firm value varies systematically across firms 
with corporate characteristics. For example, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) show cash is value at a 
premium when it is by riskier companies with growth opportunities and at discount when held by mature 
firms with less volatile cash flow. In a similar vein, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that cash holdings 
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that trading discontinuity is detrimental to firm value. This finding is consistent with the evidence 
in Fang et al. (2009), which also shows that stock liquidity improves firm value. The interaction 
terms in Columns (1) and (2) are positive and significant, implying that the value of the marginal 
dollar of excess cash held by illiquid firms is significantly higher than that held by more liquid 
firms. This finding is again consistent with predictions of our investment opportunities hypothesis. 
 Most of the control variables in the regressions are significant. The significantly positive 
coefficient on firm size is consistent with Mueller’s (1987) view that big firm size implies greater 
efficiency, as it might an outcome of a firm’s exploration and exploitation activities. Share 
turnover is also positive and significant, indicating the presence of liquidity premium in stock 
returns (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). The positive coefficient on capital expenditure indicates 
that firms that invest more may have greater growth opportunities and higher valuation (Roll et 
al., 2009). Leverage is significantly negative, presumably reflecting the distress costs associated 
with having debt in the capital structure. Finally, the significantly negative coefficient on the 
dividend dummy suggests that dividend paying firms are less constrained and therefore have more 
free cash flow, which can potentially be wasted by entrenched managers (Harford et al., 2008).       
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 In summary, our results provide strong support of the investment opportunities hypothesis, 
which suggests that excess cash improves trading continuity and reduces the sensitivity of stock 
prices to shocks to aggregate liquidity. We also show that while the direct effect of excess cash 
on firm value is negative, its indirect effect through liquidity is significantly positive, indicating 
that shareholders are less likely to sanction (or even reward) firms with high trading discontinuity 
                                            
by well-governed firms tend to command premium values while cash holding by poorly governed firms 
tend to be penalized by market investors.      
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and liquidity risk for  holding excess cash. These findings remain robust after controlling for other 
well-known determinants of stock liquidity and firm value. 
 
5.2. Additional analysis and robustness tests 
In this section, we conduct numerous tests to check the robustness of our results after adjusting 
for endogeneity and to alternative estimation methods, alternative measures of the key variables, 
and alternative subsamples and time periods.  
 
5.2.1. Endogeneity concerns 
The documented negative effects of excess cash on trading continuity and liquidity risk might be 
endogenous for two reasons. First, omitted variables that are correlated with both liquidity and 
excess cash may bias our estimates towards our baseline results. Second, stock liquidity may also 
influence a firm’s decision to hoard cash (Gopalan et al., 2012), implying that causality might 
operate in the reverse direction. Although the use of fixed effects and the extensive set of control 
variables may have already absorbed the effects of a wide array of omitted variables and the use 
of lagged independent variables may have alleviated concerns of reverse causality, the 
endogeneity issues relating to both omitted variables and reverse causality may not be fully 
resolved. 
 To further alleviate these endogeneity concerns, we use an instrument variable (IV) 
approach as an identification strategy to test the effects of excess cash on trading discontinuity 
and liquidity risk. We estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV regressions with industry and 
year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the firm level. In the first stage, we regress 
ECASH on a selected instrumental variable and a set of control variables. Admittedly, finding a 
variable based on economic theory that predicts excess cash but not trading continuity or liquidity 
risk is quite challenging. Nevertheless, we use the natural logarithm of the industry average excess 
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cash (IECASH) as our instrument.12 IECASH is likely to be related to firm-level excess cash as 
firms in the same industry may adopt a similar cash holding policy. Furthermore, although the 
liquidity characteristics of a given firm might influence the same firm’s excess cash holdings, they 
are unlikely to be related to industry-level excess cash holdings. Managers may also have 
influence over their own firm’s excess cash holdings, but they should have limited influence, if 
any, on other firms’ excess cash holding policies. Thus, IECASH should be a valid instrument, as 
it is likely to be related to firm-level excess cash, but not to trading discontinuity or liquidity risk. 
The F-statistic from the Kleibergen-Paap test is significant, indicating that IECASH is not a weak 
instrument.     
 Table 4 presents the results of the 2SLS IV regressions. Columns (1) and (3) present the 
results of the first stage with ECASH as the dependent variable. The coefficients on IECASH is 
positive and significant, suggesting that firm level and industry level excess cash are positively 
related to one another. We use the predicted values of ECASH from the first-stage regression in 
the second stage equation. Columns (2) and (4) report the second stage results using lnLM12 and 
LIQBETA as liquidity proxies, respectively. The results continue to show a negative relation 
between ECASH and both lnLM12 and LIQBETA, which suggests a casual relation from excess 
cash to both trading discontinuity and liquidity risk. Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent 
with the predictions of the investment opportunities hypothesis, which suggests that excess cash 
improves trading continuity and reduces stock price exposure to innovations in aggregate 
liquidity.     
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                            
12
 The use of the industry average of the main explanatory variable as an instrument variable in 2SLS is 
common in the literature (see, e.g., John and Knyazeva, 2006; John and Kadyrzhanova, 2008; Jiraporn et 
al., 2011; Ghaly et al., 2015).  
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5.2.2. Alternative estimation methods 
In our earlier analysis, we use robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelations in the residuals of the pooled OLS regression. For robustness purposes, we also 
use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression method to account for the cross-correlations and the 
serial correlations in the residual terms. Specifically, each year we estimate cross-sectional 
regressions of firm liquidity on excess cash and other control variables. We then average the yearly 
cross-sectional slope coefficients to obtain the final estimates and use the time series of the 
coefficient estimates to compute standard errors.  
Table 5 presents the Fama-MacBeth estimates with lnLM12 (column (1)) and LIQBETA 
(column (2)) as the dependent variable, respectively. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The 
coefficient on ECASH is significantly negative in both columns, indicating that firms with high 
excess cash on average trade more frequently and have lower liquidity risk than those with low 
excess cash.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
5.2.3. Alternative measures of liquidity 
To further examine the robustness of our results, we use the illiquidity ratio by Amihud (2002) 
and the bid-ask spread as alternative liquidity measures. The illiquidity ratio is defined as the 
average of the daily ratio between the absolute value of the stock’s return and its dollar volume 
over the prior 12 months, where the final value is multiplied by (ͳͲ଺). The bid-ask spread is 
defined as the average value of the daily difference between the ask price and bid price, divided 
by the ask price, over the past 12 months.  
The results are reported in Table 6 (see Panel A for Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure 
and Panel B for the Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) bid-ask spread). The coefficient on ECASH 
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is negative and significant at the 1% level, except for the subsample of NYSE/AMEX firms when 
the bid-ask spread is used as the liquidity measure. Overall, our findings suggest that excess cash 
reduces illiquidity and trading costs and the reduction is larger for NASDAQ firms, consistent 
with the predictions of the investment opportunities hypothesis.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
5.2.4. The role of financial constraints and growth opportunities 
Existing studies show that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms (see, 
e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Chan et al., 2012) and for firms with 
growth opportunities (see, e.g., Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007; Denis and Sibilkov, 2009; 
Brown and Petersen, 2011). In this section, we investigate whether the extra benefits of holding 
excess cash that accrue to these types of firms can be at least partly attributed to the reduction in 
their liquidity risk. Following existing studies (e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Acharya et al., 2007; 
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016), we use firm size, dividends, credit rating, the KZ index of 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), the WW index of Whited and Wu (2006), and the HP index of 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) as proxies for financial constraints. More specifically, at the beginning 
of every year, we define financially constrained firms as those: (i) in the bottom three size deciles; 
(ii) that do not pay dividends; (iii) that do not have credit ratings; (iv) in the top three KZ index 
deciles; (v) in the top three WW index deciles; and (vi) in the top three HP index deciles. The 
definition of each financial constraint proxy is given in Appendix A. Following the literature (see, 
e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Bates el al., 2009), we also use book-to-
market equity ratios, R&D expenses and capital expenditures as proxies for growth opportunities. 
At the beginning of each year, we divide the sample firms into high and low growth firms based 
on the mean value of each proxy for growth opportunities. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
To test whether the liquidity benefits of holding excess cash accrues more to financial 
constrained firms or to firms with growth opportunities, we modify our baseline equation as 
follows: ܮܫܷܳܫܦܫܶ �ܻ,� = ߙ଴ + ߚ଴ܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ + ߙଵܦܷܯ + ߚଵܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ ∗ ܦܷܯ +  ߛܼ�,�−ଵ +ܻܧܣܴ + ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ + ߮�,�                                                                                                      (6) 
 
where ܦܷܯ is a dummy variable that is defined either as FC, which takes a value of one if the 
firm is financially constrained, and zero otherwise or GO, which equals to one for firms with high 
growth opportunities, and zero otherwise. The remaining variables are as defined in Section 3.3. 
Our variable of interest is the interaction term (ܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ ∗ ܦܷܯ). When ܦܷܯ is set to equal 
FC, a significantly negative (positive) ߚଵ would suggest that the liquidity benefits of excess cash 
is significantly higher (lower) for financially constrained firms than unconstrained firms. 
Similarly, when ܦܷܯ is set to equal GO, a significantly negative (positive) ߚଵ would imply that 
excess cash brings more (less) liquidity benefits to growth firms than value firms.    
 Table 7 presents the results of the various specification of Equation (6). Panel A reports 
the results for financially constrained and unconstrained firms. When lnLM12 is used as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient on ܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ ∗ ܨܥ is negative and significant across all of 
the constraints measures, except KZ index, suggesting that the improvement in trading continuity 
associated with holding excess cash is greater for financial constrained firms. The coefficient on ܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ ∗ ܨܥ is also negative and significant for four out of the six constraints measures when 
LIQBETA is used as the dependent variable. For the remaining two classifications, namely credit 
ratings and KZ index, the magnitude of the ECASH coefficient is almost the same for the 
constrained and unconstrained firms. Nevertheless, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and Farre-Mensa 
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and Ljungqvist (2016) show that the dividend payout is unlikely to measure financial constraints 
and credit ratings are more likely to capture firm size and age rather than financial constraints. 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) suggest that the KZ index is not related to firm characteristics that are 
believed to be associated with financial constraints and it is therefore unlikely to be a measure of 
financial constraints. Given these criticisms, we base our conclusions on more recently developed 
proxies for financial constraints, namely the WW index and the HP index, which suggest that 
excess cash reduces trading discontinuity and liquidity risk and the effect is greater for constrained 
firms. 
Panel B reports the results for the high and low growth firms. In the specification where 
lnLM12 is the dependent variable, the coefficient on ܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ ∗ ܩܱ is negative and highly 
significant when R&D and CAPEX are used as growth opportunity measures. When LIQBETA is 
the dependent variable, the coefficient ܧܥܣܵܪ�,�−ଵ ∗ ܩܱ is negative, but only significant when 
R&D is used as the growth opportunities measure. These findings suggest that excess cash reduces 
trading discontinuity and liquidity risk and the effect is generally stronger for firms with greater 
growth opportunities.   
Overall, our results suggest that the reduction in trading discontinuity and liquidity risk 
associated with holding excess cash is greater for financially constrained firms and firms with 
high growth opportunities, consistent with our investment opportunities hypothesis.    
 
5.2.5. The role of crisis 
Duchin et al. (2010) show that firms rely more heavily on cash holdings to finance their 
investments during the 2008 financial crisis. They also show that cash-rich firms outperform cash-
poor firms during the recent financial crisis. This evidence suggests that investors perceive firms 
with excess cash as good investments during economic downturns and that the liquidity benefits 
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of excess cash may be unique to the crisis periods. To investigate this possibility, we split our 
sample into crisis and non-crisis periods and present the results in Table 8. 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results for the periods before 2008, between 2008 and 2009, 
and after 2009. The coefficient on ECASH is significantly negative across the three sub-periods, 
suggesting that the liquidity benefits of excess cash are not unique to the recent global financial 
crisis. To further investigate the role of the crisis, we use information on the US business cycle 
expansions and contractions available from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
and identify the years 1991, 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009 as crisis years. Panel B present the results 
for the crisis and non-crisis periods. We find that excess cash improves trading continuity in both 
crisis and non-crisis periods. We also find that excess cash reduces liquidity betas, but this effect 
is significant only in the non-crisis periods. These results refute the view that the liquidity benefits 
of excess cash are specific to economic downturns.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
6. Conclusion 
Existing empirical studies on cash holdings focus mainly on the effects of corporate cash reserves 
on firm value and firm performance (e.g., Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 
2007; Brown and Peterson, 2011). In this paper, we assess the costs and the benefits of excess 
cash by investigating the link between excess cash and the liquidity risk faced by investors and 
their required liquidity premium. To this end, we propose and test two competing hypotheses. The 
investment opportunities hypothesis asserts that excess cash reduces the volatility in the value of 
assets-in-place and attracts more uninformed trading, which, in turn, reduces trading costs, 
increases trading continuity, and reduces liquidity risk. In contrast, the management entrenchment 
hypothesis suggests that managers hoard cash to pursue their own objectives at shareholder 
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expense. The growing fear of expropriation renders firms with excess cash unattractive to 
uninformed traders. The reduced participation of these traders, in turn, increases the cost at which 
market makers provide liquidity services, reduces investors’ propensity to trade and increases 
liquidity risk. 
 We examine a large sample of US stocks and find evidence consistent with the investment 
opportunities hypothesis. Specifically, we show that excess cash reduces incidents of no trading 
and reduces stock price vulnerability to shocks to market liquidity. As investors face reduced 
liquidity risk, they require a lower liquidity premium. In terms of economic significance, our 
analysis suggests that a one unit increase in excess cash is associated with a 0.06 decline in 
liquidity beta, which translates into an average reduction of 0.489 percentage points (or 5.366% 
relative the sample mean) per annum in the cost of equity capital. We also investigate the impact 
of excess cash holdings on firm value. We show that while the direct effect of excess cash on firm 
value is negative, its indirect effect through liquidity is positive. Specifically, we find that the 
value to the marginal dollar of excess cash held by illiquid firms is significantly higher than that 
held by more liquid firms. Further analysis suggests that liquidity benefits of excess cash are 
higher for financial constrained firms and firms with high growth opportunities. Our results are 
robust over time, after addressing potential endogeneity issues, and to alternative estimation 
methods and alternative measures of liquidity. 
 Overall, this study contributes to literature on the link between cash holdings and stock 
liquidity (e.g., Gopalan et al., 2012; Charoenwong et al., 2014) by showing that excess cash 
improves trading continuity and liquidity risk. It also adds to the stream of studies on the link 
between corporate liquidity management and the expected equity returns (e.g., Palazzo, 2009; 
Simutin, 2010; Asem and Alam, 2014) by identifying liquidity risk as a channel through which 
excess cash can affect the cost of equity capital. Furthermore, it contributes to the literature by 
identifying liquidity as a new channel through which excess cash can affect firm value. Finally, 
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we advance the literature on liquidity risk (e.g., Liu, 2006; Ng., 2011; Cao and Petrasek, 2014) by 
showing that excess cash is an important determinant of the liquidity beta. 
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Table 1  
Sample characteristics by stock market exchanges and trading continuity. 
This table reports the mean and the median (in parentheses) of the dependent and independent variables 
used in our regression models over the period 1991-2014. lnLM12 is a natural logarithm of Liu’s (2006) 
trading continuity measure (LM12) and LIQBETA is the liquidity beta from Liu’s (2006) liquidity-
augmented CAPM (LCAMP). ECASH is the excess cash estimated as the residual of Equation (3); MTB is 
market value of assets divided by total assets; SIZE is the natural log of net assets deflated in 1994 dollars; 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt scaled by net assets; DIV is a dummy variable with a value of one if 
a firm pays dividend, and zero otherwise; CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by net assets; R&D is 
research and development expenditure scaled by sales; PRICE is the stock price; RET is the stock return; 
NSHAR is the number of shareholders; BLOCK is the total block ownership; IO is the total shares 
outstanding held by 13F institutions; NASDAQ is a dummy variable equal to one for NSADAQ stocks, and 
zero otherwise. The values of ECASH, MTB, SIZE, LEVERAGE, DIV, CAPEX, R&D, PRICE, RET, 
NSHAR, BLOCK, IO and NASDAQ are lagged in one period. Detailed variable definitions and sources are 
provided in Appendix A.  
 
 Full sample NYSE/AMEX NASDAQ 
 (N=28,310) (N=15,018) (N=13,292)  
lnLM12 0.321 0.224 0.432 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
LIQBETA -0.222 -0.156 -0.297 
 
[-0.140] [-0.082] [-0.231] 
ECASH 0.039 -0.052 0.143 
 
[0.204] [0.083] [0.341] 
MTB 2.020 1.828 2.237 
 
[1.589] [1.519] [1.706] 
SIZE 5.959 6.817 4.991 
 
[5.938] [6.816] [4.951] 
LEVERAGE 0.237 0.267 0.203 
 
[0.206] [0.252] [0.124] 
DIV 0.451 0.612 0.269 
 
[0.000] [1.000] [0.000] 
CAPEX 0.070 0.068 0.073 
 
[0.050] [0.050] [0.051] 
R&D 0.094 0.024 0.173 
 
[0.002] [0.000] [0.014] 
PRICE 26.197 31.615 20.076 
 
[20.600] [26.510] [15.000] 
RET 0.190 0.176 0.205 
 
[0.097] [0.112] [0.075] 
NSHAR 1.387 1.739 0.989 
 
[1.037] [1.447] [0.655] 
BLOCK 22.921 20.631 25.508 
 [17.360] [14.610] [20.770] 
IO 51.343 54.701 47.548 
 [57.295] [62.934] [49.122] 
NASDAQ 0.470 0.000 1.000 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [1.000] 
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Table 2  
Correlation matrix of the dependent and independent variables. 
This table shows the unconditional, pair-wise correlations of the variables used in the regression models. lnLM12 is the natural logarithm of Liu’s (2006) 
trading continuity measure (LM12) and LIQBETA is the liquidity beta from Liu’s (2006) liquidity-augmented CAPM (LCAMP). ECASH is the excess cash 
estimated as the residual of Equation (3); MTB is market value of assets divided by total assets; SIZE is the natural log of net assets deflated in 1994 dollars; 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt scaled by net assets; DIV is a dummy variable with a value of one if a firm pays dividend, and zero otherwise; CAPEX is 
capital expenditures scaled by net assets; R&D is research and development expenditure scaled by sales; PRICE is the stock price; RET is the stock return; 
NSHAR is the number of shareholders; BLOCK is the total block ownership; IO is the total shares outstanding held by 13F institutions; NASDAQ is a dummy 
variable equal to one for NSADAQ stocks, and zero otherwise. The values of ECASH, MTB, SIZE, LEVERAGE, DIV, CAPEX, R&D, PRICE, RET, NSHAR, 
BLOCK, IO, and NASDAQ are lagged in one period. Detailed variable definitions and sources are provided in Appendix A. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n. o. 
a. lnLM12 1 
              
b. LIQBETA  0.07*** 1 
             
c. ECASH -0.06*** -0.05*** 1 
            
d. MTB -0.15*** -0.07*** 0 1 
           
e. SIZE -0.35*** 0.02** -0.02*** -0.22*** 1 
          
f. LEVERAGE -0.03*** 0.04*** 0 -0.10*** 0.23*** 1 
         
g. DIV -0.02*** 0.05*** -0.01* -0.08*** 0.37*** -0.03*** 1 
        
h. CAPEX -0.01 -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.12*** -0.07*** 0 -0.07*** 1 
       
i. R&D -0.05*** -0.04*** 0.01 0.25*** -0.27*** 0.06*** -0.16*** 0.09*** 1 
      
j. PRICE -0.20*** 0 0.03*** 0.22*** 0.53*** -0.04*** 0.32*** 0.01 -0.11*** 1 
     
k. RET -0.04*** -0.06*** 0 0.17*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** 0.10*** -0.02*** 0.10*** 1 
    
l. NSHAR -0.20*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01* 0.56*** 0.05*** 0.32*** -0.01 -0.07*** 0.30*** -0.02*** 1 
   
m. BLOCK 0.31*** 0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.29*** 0.03*** -0.10*** 0.03*** -0.03*** -0.22*** -0.02* -0.28*** 1 
  
n. IO -0.27*** -0.03*** 0.05*** 0 0.32*** -0.01 0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.28*** 0.01 0.05*** -0.33*** 1 
 
o. NASDAQ 0.12*** -0.03*** 0.06*** 0.16*** -0.49*** -0.14*** -0.34*** 0.03*** 0.18*** -0.28*** 0.02*** -0.30*** 0.12*** -0.11*** 1 
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Table 3 
Excess cash and trading continuity. 
This table displays results for the OLS estimations of the baseline regression model (Equation (4)). The dependent variable is the liquidity measure and is 
measured in two different ways: (a) as the natural logarithm of Liu’s (2006) LM12 (��ܮܯͳʹሻ and (b) as the liquidity beta (ߚ�௟) in Equation (2) (ܮܫܳܤܧܶܣ). 
Definitions of all dependent and independent variables can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A. The estimations include year and two-digit SIC industry 
dummies. The t-statistics, which are adjusted for clustering by firm and year, are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: lnLM12  Dependent variable: LIQBETA 
 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Subsample 
NYSE/AMEX 
Subsample 
NASDAQ 
 Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Subsample 
NYSE/AMEX 
Subsample 
NASDAQ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      
        
ECASH 
-0.038*** -0.035*** -0.018* -0.046***  -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.043*** -0.082*** 
 (-4.262) (-4.269) (-1.719) (-3.983)  (-6.256) (-6.177) (-3.799) (-5.552) 
MTB 
 -0.158*** -0.140*** -0.157***   -0.090*** -0.038** -0.103*** 
 
 (-10.652) (-8.102) (-9.725)   (-3.417) (-1.970) (-3.084) 
SIZE 
 -0.220*** -0.237*** -0.199***   -0.061** -0.037 -0.078*** 
 
 (-9.640) (-8.637) (-7.760)   (-2.351) (-1.177) (-3.106) 
LEVERAGE 
 0.185*** 0.211*** 0.140**   0.224** 0.176 0.239* 
 
 (3.715) (2.732) (2.473)   (2.489) (1.618) (1.916) 
DIV 
 0.129*** 0.062** 0.215***   0.121*** 0.091** 0.118** 
 
 (4.265) (1.990) (4.069)   (3.206) (2.136) (2.173) 
CAPEX 
 -0.686*** -0.987*** -0.518***   -0.621** -1.173** -0.093 
 
 (-4.500) (-4.289) (-2.670)   (-2.068) (-2.258) (-0.257) 
R&D 
 -0.169*** -0.037 -0.159***   -0.159 -0.070 -0.154 
 
 (-6.429) (-0.394) (-6.677)   (-1.489) (-0.304) (-1.605) 
PRICE 
 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006***   0.003** 0.003** 0.003 
 
 (6.978) (6.276) (4.290)   (2.009) (2.329) (1.145) 
RET 
 -0.042** -0.043** -0.047**   -0.133*** -0.116* -0.125*** 
 
 (-2.474) (-2.251) (-2.573)   (-2.751) (-1.787) (-3.012) 
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NSHAR 
 0.027*** 0.056*** -0.014   0.070*** 0.061*** 0.064** 
 
 (3.066) (4.279) (-0.862)   (5.150) (4.039) (2.107) 
BLOCK 
 0.762*** 0.569*** 0.937***   0.075 0.012 0.119 
 
 (8.262) (6.561) (6.600)   (1.222) (0.236) (1.165) 
IO 
 -0.183*** -0.161*** -0.196***   -0.130* -0.143** -0.121 
 
 (-4.553) (-3.507) (-3.272)   (-1.892) (-2.007) (-1.124) 
NASDAQ 
 0.053     -0.032   
 
 (1.318)     (-0.809)   
lnLM12 
      0.078*** 0.075*** 0.089*** 
 
      (3.603) (2.884) (3.734) 
Constant 1.095*** 2.151*** 2.001*** 2.382***  0.498*** 0.654*** 0.384 0.838*** 
 (3.741) (7.409) (11.082) (4.020)  (3.127) (2.974) (1.305) (4.230) 
Observations 28,310 28,310 15,018 13,292  28,310 28,310 15,018 13,292 
Adjusted R-squared 0.063 0.273 0.253 0.318  0.031 0.043 0.051 0.052 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4  
The joint effect of trading liquidity and excess cash on firm valuation.   
This table displays results for the OLS estimations of the valuation regression model (Equation (5)). The 
dependent variable Q is defined as the market capitalization of common stock plus book value of long-
term debt divided by total assets. The main independent variables are excess cash, trading liquidity and the 
interaction of these two.  Liquidity (LIQUIDITY) measure is either ��ܮܯͳʹ or ܮܫܳܤܧܶܣ, which captures 
the trading activities during the current year. Following Roll et al. (2009), we include SIZE (market 
capitalization), TURNOVER (the sum of daily turnover over the prior 12 months), ROA (net income divided 
by total assets), CAPEX (capital expenditures by net assets), LTD (long-term debt divided by total assets), 
and DIV (dividend dummy which equals one if the firm pays a dividend, otherwise zero) as control 
variables in the regression. The t-statistics, which are adjusted for clustering by firm and year, are reported 
in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: Q 
LIQUIDITY measures: lnLM12 LIQBETA 
      
ECASH -0.104*** -0.088*** 
 (-5.269) (-5.513) 
LIQUIDITY -0.017 -0.026** 
 (-0.633) (-2.099) 
ECASHxLIQUIDITY 0.039*** 0.009** 
 (3.725) (2.234) 
SIZE 0.170*** 0.174*** 
 (5.825) (6.919) 
TURNOVER 0.310*** 0.306*** 
 (4.847) (4.953) 
ROA 0.294 0.294 
 (0.515) (0.522) 
CAPEX 4.484*** 4.450*** 
 (9.322) (9.359) 
LTD -1.354*** -1.347*** 
 (-6.898) (-6.860) 
DIV -0.284*** -0.278*** 
 (-5.081) (-5.178) 
Constant 1.193*** 1.161*** 
 (3.846) (3.836) 
Observations 22,236 22,236 
Adjusted R-squared 0.198 0.198 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
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Table 5  
The results of the two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS IV) regressions.  
In the first stage, we regress excess cash (ECASH) on a selected instrument variable and a set of control 
variables, including industry and year dummies. We use the natural logarithm of the industry average 
excess cash holding (IECASH) as our instrument. We use the predicted values of ECASH from the first-
stage regression in the second stage regressions. Further details on variable definitions and sources can be 
found in Table 1 and Appendix A. The t-values (for the first stage) and z-values (for the second stage) are 
reported in the parentheses and are computed from the heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors, clustered 
by firm. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  Dependent variables     
 
First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
  ECASH lnLM12 ECASH LIQBETA 
IECASH 1.047***  1.043***  
 
(0.025)  (0.025)  
ECASH (instrumented)  -0.043***  -0.091*** 
 
 (0.016)  (0.019) 
MTB -0.099*** -0.158*** -0.111*** -0.093*** 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) 
SIZE -0.057*** -0.220*** -0.074*** -0.063*** 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) 
LEVERAGE 0.474*** 0.188*** 0.487*** 0.234*** 
 
(0.077) (0.045) (0.077) (0.068) 
DIV 0.144*** 0.130*** 0.154*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.037) (0.026) (0.037) (0.027) 
CAPEX 1.410*** -0.673*** 1.353*** -0.582** 
 
(0.226) (0.135) (0.226) (0.245) 
R&D -0.182*** -0.170*** -0.195*** -0.162*** 
 
(0.031) (0.016) (0.031) (0.045) 
PRICE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
RET -0.013 -0.042*** -0.016 -0.133*** 
 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.027) 
NSHAR 0.066*** 0.028*** 0.068*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) 
BLOCK -0.033 0.761*** 0.026 0.076 
 (0.082) (0.060) (0.082) (0.068) 
IO 0.217*** -0.180*** 0.202*** -0.123*** 
 (0.053) (0.033) (0.053) (0.045) 
NASDAQ 0.141*** 0.054* 0.145*** -0.026 
 
(0.043) (0.031) (0.043) (0.030) 
lnLM12   -0.078*** 0.076*** 
 
  (0.019) (0.014) 
Constant -0.197  -0.029  
 
(0.207)  (0.203)  
Observations 28,310 28,310 28,310 28,310 
Adjusted R-squared 0.283 0.241 0.285 0.023 
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Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV F-stat 1797.80***  1783.42*** 
 
CD Wald F-stat 6874.43***   6838.26***   
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Table 6  
The results from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. 
This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression estimates of Equation (4). The dependent variable is 
either lnLM12 or LIQBETA. The regression models include control variables, which are defined in more 
details in Table 1 and Appendix A. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variables 
 
lnLM12 LIQBETA 
      
ECASH -0.042*** -0.068*** 
 
(-7.366) (-5.294) 
MTB -0.170*** -0.078** 
 
(-9.337) (-2.759) 
SIZE -0.250*** -0.055** 
 
(-9.842) (-2.100) 
LEVERAGE 0.257*** 0.291*** 
 
(6.278) (3.104) 
DIV 0.167*** 0.133*** 
 
(8.103) (3.464) 
CAPEX -0.432*** -0.395 
 
(-6.312) (-1.006) 
R&D -0.193*** -0.237** 
 
(-7.896) (-2.432) 
PRICE 0.007*** 0.003** 
 
(7.876) (2.212) 
RET -0.038* -0.118** 
 
(-2.066) (-2.417) 
NSHAR 0.050*** 0.087*** 
 
(6.219) (6.433) 
BLOCK 0.810*** 0.151 
 (9.210) (1.491) 
IO -0.205*** -0.122* 
 (-7.536) (-1.875) 
NASDAQ 0.062** -0.040 
 
(2.137) (-0.959) 
lnLM12  0.067** 
 
 (2.470) 
Constant 1.733*** 0.045 
 
(12.546) (0.215) 
Observations 28,310 28,310 
Average R-squared 0.261 0.083 
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Table 7 
Alternative liquidity measures. 
This table displays results from Equation (4) with Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity and the bid-ask spread as 
alternative liquidity measures. Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity is defined as the average of the daily ratio of 
the absolute value of a stock’s return to its dollar volume over the past the past 12 months. The bid-ask 
spread is defined as the average value of the daily difference between ask price and bid price, divided by 
the ask price, over the past 12 months. All regressions include control variables, year and two-digit SIC 
industry dummies. The t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses and 
detailed variable definitions and sources can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A. The asterisks *, **, and 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Full Sample Subsample NYSE/AMEX 
Subsample  
NASDAQ 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Amihud (2002) Illiquidity 
ECASH 
-0.018*** -0.009*** -0.026*** 
 
(-6.725) (-3.264) (-5.294) 
Observations 28,310 15,018 13,292 
Adjusted R-squared 0.121 0.109 0.135 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Bid-ask spread  
ECASH 
-0.060*** 0.001 -0.092*** 
 
(-6.389) (0.125) (-6.622) 
Observations 23,858 10,967 12,891 
Adjusted R-squared 0.636 0.674 0.669 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8 
The role of financial constraints and growth opportunities. 
This table provides a summary of the estimation of Equation (6). We define financially constrained firms 
as those: (i) in the bottom three size deciles; (ii) that do not pay dividend; (iii) that do not have credit 
ratings; (iv) in the top three KZ index deciles; (v) in the top three WW index deciles; and (vi) in the top 
three HP index deciles. We use book-to-market equity ratios, R&D expenses, and capital expenditures as 
proxies for growth opportunities. At the beginning of each year, we calculate the mean value of each proxy 
of growth opportunities and set a dummy value to 1 (0) for firms with high (low) growth opportunities. All 
regressions include control variables, year and two-digit SIC industry dummies. The t-statistics adjusted 
for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses and detailed variable definitions and sources 
can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Interacted with financial constraint dummy (FC)       
 
Dependent variable: lnLM12       
FC measures: ECASH t-stat ECASHxFC t-stat N Adj. R2 
Firm size 0.025*** (2.674) -0.129*** (-6.393) 18,779 0.323 
Payout ratio -0.010 (-0.831) -0.054*** (-3.440) 18,492 0.287 
Credit ratings 0.016* (1.932) -0.076*** (-5.663) 28,310 0.277 
KZ index -0.053*** (-3.022) 0.030 (1.478) 13,951 0.254 
WW index 0.024** (2.401) -0.103*** (-5.373) 18,247 0.294 
HP index -0.004 (-0.423) -0.082*** (-4.710) 13,697 0.281 
 
Dependent variable: LIQBETA       
FC measures: ECASH t-stat ECASHxFC t-stat N Adj. R2 
Firm size -0.036** (-2.089) -0.052*** (-3.079) 18,779 0.038 
Payout ratio -0.028** (-2.132) -0.065** (-2.311) 18,492 0.042 
Credit ratings -0.061*** (-3.872) -0.006 (-0.444) 28,310 0.043 
KZ index -0.091*** (-5.412) 0.026 (1.101) 13,951 0.043 
WW index -0.026** (-2.025) -0.064*** (-3.075) 18,247 0.036 
HP index -0.011 (-0.572) -0.078*** (-2.961) 13,697 0.042 
              
Panel B: Interacted with growth opportunities dummy (GO)    
 
Dependent variable: lnLM12       
GO measures: ECASH t-stat ECASHxGO t-stat N Adj. R2 
MTB -0.038*** (-3.869) 0.014 (1.188) 28,310 0.275 
R&D -0.024*** (-2.672) -0.059*** (-3.232) 28,310 0.275 
CAPEX -0.029*** (-3.032) -0.019* (-1.737) 28,310 0.273 
 
Dependent variable: LIQBETA       
GO measures: ECASH t-stat ECASHxGO t-stat N Adj. R2 
MTB -0.062*** (-5.905) -0.012 (-0.486) 28,310 0.043 
R&D -0.044*** (-4.760) -0.118*** (-2.676) 28,310 0.044 
CAPEX -0.057*** (-4.832) -0.023 (-1.251) 28,310 0.043 
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Table 9 
Sub-period analysis. 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates of Equation (4) for the period before and after 2008. To further investigate the role of crisis, Panel A report 
the results for three sub-periods: before 2008, 2008-2009, and after 2009 for the liquidity model with lnLM12 and LIQBETA, respectively. In Panel B, we use 
the US business cycle expansions and contractions information available in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and identify the years 1991, 
2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009 as episodes of crisis and estimate Equation (4) separately for crisis and non-crisis periods. All regressions include control variables, 
year and two-digit SIC industry dummies. The t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses and detailed variable definitions 
and sources can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Dependent variable: lnLM12   Dependent variable: LIQBETA 
 
Before 2008 2008-2009 After 2009   Before 2008 2008-2009 After2009 
ECASH -0.046*** -0.025*** -0.006  -0.069*** -0.078*** -0.044*** 
 
(-5.063) (-3.736) (-0.941)  (-4.855) (-3.582) (-2.671) 
Observations 20,260 2,814 5,236  20,260 2,814 5,236 
Adjusted R-squared 0.299 0.155 0.159  0.051 0.075 0.040 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable: lnLM12  Dependent variable: LIQBETA 
 
Off crisis (NBER) During crisis (NBER)  Off crisis (NBER) During crisis (NBER) 
ECASH 
-0.036*** -0.031***  -0.072*** -0.035 
 
(-4.007) (-4.228)  (-6.829) (-1.210) 
Observations 23,122 5,188  23,122 5,188 
Adjusted R-squared 0.279 0.246  0.049 0.041 
Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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Appendix A 
Variable definitions. 
The data sources are CRSP and Compustat unless specified otherwise. Data item codes are in Italics.  
 
lnLM12 A natural logarithm form of Liu (2006)’s stock liquidity measure, which is the 
standardized turnover-adjusted number of days with zero trading volumes over 
prior 12 months (LM12): LMͳʹ = [ZEROS + ሺͳ/TURNOVERሻ/DEFLATOR] ∗ʹ5ʹ/TRAD, where ZEROS is the total number of zero daily trading volumes in 
prior 12 months, TURNOVER is the sum of daily turnover over the prior 12 
month, DEFLATOR is set to 11,000  as in Liu (2006) in order to ensure that Ͳ < ଵ/୘୙R୒୓୚୉Rୈ୉୊LA୘୓R < ͳ for all stocks, and TRAD is the total number of trading 
days over the prior 12 months. 
LIQBETA The liquidity beta is estimated from Liu’s (2006) two-factor monthly time-series 
regression of stock excess returns on market excess returns and a liquidity 
mimicking factor over the prior 12 months for firm i in a given year: rit − rft =Ƚi + Ⱦi୫ሺr୫t − rftሻ + Ⱦi୪LIQt,i + εit , where rit , rft , and  r୫t  are monthly 
returns of firm i, US market, and one-month Treasury bill. Market return and 
one-month Treasury bill data is obtained from Kenneth French Website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html). LIQ is 
the mimicking liquidity, kindly provided by Weimin Liu More details on the 
construction of this factor can refer to Liu (2006, pp 550-551).  
ECASH The residual of a cross-sectional regression of cash holdings on firm 
characteristics (Equation (3)). The dependent variable is the natural log of cash 
and short-term investments (che) scaled by net assets (at-che). The independent 
variables include  the ratio of cash flows (ebitda-xint-txt-dvc) scaled by net 
assets;  the ratio of total debt (dltt+dlc) scaled by net assets; the market value of 
assets divided by total assets (at-ceq+(csho*prcc)/at); the natural log of net 
assets (at-che) deflated in 1994 dollars; net working capital (wcap-che), scaled 
by net assets; capital expenditures (capx) scaled by net assets;  a dummy variable 
with a value of one if a firm pays dividends (dvc) and zero, otherwise; research 
and development expenses (xrd) scaled by sales (sales); a dummy which equals 
to one if a firm is in a regulated industry (including railroads (SIC code 4011), 
trucking (SIC code 4210 and 4213), airlines (SIC code 4512), and telecom (SIC 
code 4812 and 4813)), and zero otherwise; industry cash flow risk, defined as 
the mean of the ratio of the standard deviations of cash flows dividend by the 
total assets over 20 years for firms in the same industry (2-digit SIC code).  
MTB The market value of assets divided by total assets (at-ceq+(csho*prcc)/at). 
SIZE The natural log of net assets (at-che) deflated in 1994 dollars. 
DIV A dummy variable with a value of one if a firm pays dividend (dvc) and zero, 
otherwise. 
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by net assets, (capx/(at-che)). 
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R&D Research and development expenses (xrd) scaled by sales (sale). 
PRICE The close price on a stock in a fiscal year (prcc_f). 
RET The stock’s holding period return from CRSP (ret). 
NSHAR The natural log of the number of common/ordinary shareholders (cshr). 
BLOCK The fraction of closely held shares held by blockholders, including officers, 
directors, trusts, pension/benefit plans. Data source: Worldscope.  
IO The fraction of total shares outstanding held by 13F institutions. Data source: 
Thomson Reuters Institutional Manages (13F) Holdings. 
NASDAQ A dummy variable equal to one for NSADAQ stocks (exchg=14), and 0 
otherwise. 
Financial constraints Measures: 
(a) Firm size: Constrained (unconstrained) firms are in the bottom (top) 
three deciles sorted by firm size (SIZE). 
(b) Payout ratio: Constrained (unconstrained) firms are in the bottom (top) 
three deciles sorted by payout ratio. Payout ratio is measured as the total 
payouts (dvc+prstkc) scaled by operating income (oibdp - txt - xint - 
dvc). 
(c) Credit rating: Unrated firms by S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit 
Rating (splticrm) are classified as constrained, otherwise as financially 
unconstrained. 
(d) KZ index (Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo, 2001):  
KZ = -1.001909*[(ib +dp)/ppent]+0.2826389*[ (at + (prcc_f*csho) - 
ceq - txdb)/at] +3.139193*[(dltt + dlc)/(dltt +dlc + seq)]-39.3678*[(dvc 
+ dvp)/ppent]-1.314759*[che/ppent], where ppent is the beginning of 
year t. 
(e) WW index (Whited and Wu, 2006; Hennessy and Whited, 2007): WW 
equals 1 if the total of common dividends and preferred dividends 
(dvc+dvp) is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise.  
(f) HP index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010):  
HP= -0.737*SIZE+0.043*SIZEଶ-0.04*age, where age is measures as 
the number of years since the firm’s inception. 
Using KZ index, WW index, and HP index, constrained (unconstrained) firms 
are those in the top (bottom) three deciles. 
Growth opportunities Measures: (a) MTB; (b) R&D; (c) CAPEX (capital expenditures scaled by net 
assets, (capx/(at-che)). The full sample is split by the mean value of growth 
opportunities measure. Those greater (less) than the mean value are growth 
(value) firms.  
 
